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Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the 
Arendtian critique of the present
André Duarte
Since Auschwitz, nothing has ever happened that could 
be lived as a refutation of Auschwitz.
To live with the sensation of helplessness: today, 
probably this is the moral state under which, by 
resisting, we could be faithful to our times.
Imre Kertész
The contemporary experience of the political 'as' violence
It would be hard to find another thesis in Political Theory that is more assertive and 
unquestionable than the traditional identification of violence and politics; this is true to 
such an extent that the possibility of a non-violent politics or of tracing a conceptual 
distinction between power and violence becomes a chimera. No one doubts that violence 
is crucially inherent to political processes, and if it is true that not all violent phenomena 
are political phenomena, we feel more than certain that there would be no politics without 
violence or beyond it. Have we not been sufficiently warned - by political thinkers  as 
different  as Marx, Weber or Schmitt - that violence pertains to the core of the political? 
But, on the other hand, does the mere repetition of so-called truisms help us in any way to 
elucidate the most important political phenomena of our present? 
As we know, Hannah Arendt is among those very few thinkers in contemporary 
political theory who dared to refuse the strict identification of politics and violence, 
arguing that violence is not necessarily inherent to the political, or that violence and 
power are not the same. In works such as The Human Condition and On Violence, among 
others, Arendt tried to demonstrate that while power is spontaneously generated by 
collective and concerted actions of a plurality of citizens, violence is mute and intended to 
disperse, silence and isolate them, disrupting the civic bounds that tie them together in 
acts and speeches. While power is an end in itself, since it is the very amalgam that unifies 
political agents in the public space, violence is purely instrumental, since it is a means to 
achieve a definite end through coercion. In short, while power may generate the 
establishment of a transitory consensus, which does not eliminate the possibility of 
dissent and conflicts, pure violence is merely destructive, being incapable of creating 
anything new, and so on. 
In the present text1, however, I do not intend to follow up and discuss the Arendtian 
analysis on the philosophical origins of the traditional equation of politics and violence, 
1 This text has been firstly published in Pasajes de Pensamiento Contemporáneo, Spain, Valencia, 
n. 13, Winter of 2004. Translations are my own except where noticed  
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nor will I explore the extremely important consequences of her distinction between power 
and violence regarding the possibility of a radically democratic politics 2. What concerns 
me here is to explore Arendt's diagnosis of the present, in which politics has been 
transformed into a wide variety of different violent phenomena. Only if we do not consent 
in repeating the old and traditional identification of politics and violence will we be able 
to reconsider and rethink the meaning of our present experience of the political 'as' 
violence. After all, Arendt's thesis that power and violence are not the same - since the 
fundamental political phenomenon is not domination, but the collective generation of 
novelty in deeds and speeches - does not contradict her view that, throughout Western 
history and up to the present - or perhaps even more so nowadays -, politics has been 
experienced as violence. In fact, preventive wars have been declared and promoted by 
countries that represent themselves as absolute good fighting absolute evil in order to 
save humanity and to prevent future possible evil deeds. To achieve these goals, such 
countries may disregard previous international juridical agreements thus imposing their 
political and economic hegemony in an increasingly more violent and insecure world. 
Suicidal fundamentalists, secret organizations or even the regular armed forces of a State 
continuously launch terrorist attacks aiming at no less than the complete annihilation of 
its opponents. It is also well known that the twentieth century actually began with the 
utilization of chemical and bacteriological mass destructive weapons whose manufacture 
rapidly became more and more lethal, culminating with nuclear weapons able to destroy 
all life on the planet. With considerable frequency States do impose preventive and 
repressive policies against immigrants and refugees, as well as against political 
movements that organize the unemployed, non-conformists of all sorts, displaced and 
homeless people, among many other 'undesirable' social groups. Last but not least, 
consider the so called 'human waste' that cannot be integrated in the capitalist system of 
globalized production and consumption, a whole mass of human beings that has to be 
seductively domesticated or put under strictly repressive vigilance so that new 
superfluous human beings can be constantly produced and reproduced. By considering 
these different contemporary experiences of politics 'as' violence, one should inquire: is 
there any link or bond between them? Has Arendt anything to say in order to render them 
more understandable? 
I believe that she does have many important things to say about those phenomena and 
to start trying to answer the above mentioned questions I would like to propose a rather 
unusual hypothesis for Arendt's readers: the notion of biopolitics, which is not an 
Arendtian one, would be the missing link that fully articulates Arendt's reflections 
concerning the tragic contemporary shifts of the political, in The Human Condition, with 
her close analysis of totalitarian regimes, in The Origins of Totalitarianism. In other 
words, the notion of biopolitics would permit us to highlight the Arendtian diagnosis of 
the present in terms of the dissemination of violence and of the growing meaninglessness 
of the political in our bureaucratized, mass- and market-oriented representative 
democracies, that is, our actually existent democracies. This hypothesis is unconventional 
not only because the notion of biopolitics is absent in Arendt's thought, but also because it 
2 I have extensively dealt with these subject matters in my book O pensamento à sombra da 
ruptura: politica e filosofia em Hannah Arendt. RJ: Paz e Terra, 2000. 
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opens the path to some conclusions that she did not expressly or fully develop. However, 
as I will argue, if those conclusions stray from the exact meaning of Arendt's texts, they 
certainly do not contradict the spirit of Arendt's work on politics. This interpretive 
approach is inspired by Giorgio Agamben's work, Homo sacer: sovereign power and 
bare life, in which he argues that both Arendt and Foucault were the first contemporary 
thinkers to understand the radical changes suffered by the political in modern times.3 
According to Agamben, these changes culminate in the Nazi and Stalinist extermination 
camps with the transformation of citizens in the 'bare life' (nuda vita) of the homo sacer, 
the prototype of a man whose murder is no crime. According to Agamben's researches, 
the homo sacer was an old and rather obscure juridical figure of the Roman law that 
designated a man who had been excluded from both divine and human legislation. In 
other words, the paradox that the homo sacer - the sacrificial man - embodied in himself 
was that the only way in which he still belonged to the code of the Roman law was by 
means of his total exclusion from it. In other words, the homo sacer was deprived of any 
legal protection against anyone who attempted to murder him, providing that this murder 
was not supported by legal procedures or religious rites. This is not the place for extensive 
commentaries on Agamben's work, nor will I attempt to compare thinkers as different as 
Arendt and Foucault. Rather, I would like to stress the aspects in which Arendt's, 
Foucault's and Agamben's reflections converge, tracing a biopolitical diagnosis of the 
present.4 In short, I believe that the introduction of the notion of biopolitics in Arendt's 
thinking, which is not at all arbitrary, as I will try to demonstrate, would permit us to 
better understand the correlation between the most important manifestations of 
contemporary political violence: the extraordinary violence of totalitarian disaster, and 
the ordinary violence of our mass- and market-democracies, corroded by the loss of any 
radical political alternative to capitalism. Although assuming the risks of reading Arendt 
beyond Arendt, I believe that I remain faithful to the core of her own thinking: at last, was 
it not she herself that emphasized interweaving political thought and the crucial political 
experiences of the present? 
In order to justify introducing the notion of biopolitics where it does not originally 
appear, it is necessary to understand in what sense biopolitical violence has become the 
common denominator of contemporary politics, reducing the distance between modern 
mass representative democracies and totalitarian regimes. This idea has to be carefully 
developed since, as it is well known, Arendt considered totalitarianism to be a disruptive 
and unprecedented regime, one that broke with all past forms of political domination and 
violence, such as dictatorships, tyrannies and despotisms. In her detailed analysis of Nazi 
and Stalinist totalitarianism, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt developed a 
careful evaluation of the structural characteristics they shared and distinguished them 
3 Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. Valencia: Pre-textos, 1988 
4 The concept of 'biopolitics' first appeared in a 1974 conference titled ìThe birth of social medicineî, later 
published in Dits et écrits. It was also discussed by Foucault in his History of Sexuality, vol. 1 and later 
developed in the seminar course at the College de France of the winter semester of 1976-1977, posthumously 
published under the title of Il faut defendre la societé. It was only from the early nineties onwards that 
Agamben, Hardt and Negri, Zizek and many others paid close attention to the concept of biopolitics and fully 
developed it in many different aspects, although maintaining its specific core, the politicization of life and the 
bringing of the phenomenon of life to the center of the public sphere with its rather catastrophic results.
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from all other political regimes.5 It is not my objective to counter her argument on the 
crucial structural differences that make all the difference between our actually existing 
democracies and totalitarian regimes, but to stress that biopolitical violence has become 
the common material underlying our contemporary political experiences. It is not a 
matter of merely blurring all differences and thus of simplistically identifying 
totalitarianism and representative democracies, although one should also be attentive to 
the political blackmail implied by the obstinate repetition of a simplistic opposition of 
totalitarianism and mass democracies. Slavoj Zizek has aptly described the ideological use 
of the concept of totalitarianism as a helpful admonition that actually uses the specter of a 
possible resurgence of totalitarian regimes to undermine any radical political alternative. 
This political blackmail works like this: it is better to accept the inequalities and 
absurdities of capitalism with its liberal economic and political foundations than to 
abolish it through totalitarian and genocidal regimes.6 However, I believe that Zizek goes 
too far when he detects this ideological misuse of the notion of totalitarianism in Arendt's 
reflections since her own critical analysis of totalitarianism was never meant as a blind 
embrace of liberal democracies, an aspect that was perceived as an unacceptable betrayal 
by critics such as Sheldon Wolin, among others.7 To talk about totalitarianism today does 
not necessarily imply that one is threatening the critics of liberal democracy with the risks 
of the reappearance of the Gulag or of Auschwitz, since the critical detection of some 
rather dangerous continuities regarding the historical background in which both 
totalitarianism and liberal democracies have appeared is a crucial aspect of Arendt's and 
Agamben's analyses, as I will try to show. In other words, the analysis of totalitarianism 
remains a fundamental way of realizing and understanding the totalitarian dangers that 
surround our actually existing democracies. What really matters now is to understand the 
rather perverse biopolitical mechanisms through which human beings have been both 
included and excluded from the political and economical spheres in mass- and market 
oriented democracies and in totalitarian regimes.
Moreover, to consider totalitarianism as a disruptive event in Western history does not 
mean to refuse understanding it as a historical phenomenon, that is, as the crystallization 
of different historical elements that have become constitutive of the political in late 
modern times and, therefore, also have something to do with liberal democracies. In 
other words, although totalitarian regimes should not be considered as the necessary 
pitfall of Modernity, they should never be viewed as a mere accident in Modernity's path. 
To recall Zygmunt Bauman's Arendtian inspired analysis, totalitarianism has to be 
understood in the historic context rendered possible by the conjunction of modern 
science and technology, bureaucratic administration and mass murder, all of which are 
5 I have dealt at length with Arendt's characterization of Totalitarianism as a disruptive form of domination in 
my article ”Hannah Arendt e o evento totalitário como cristalização histórica“  in Origens do Totalitarismo, 
50 anos depois. RJ: Relume Dumar·, 2001.
6 See Zizek, S., Quién dijo Totalitarismo? Cinco intervenciones sobre el (mal) uso de una nociÛn . Valencia, 
PrÈ-Textos, 2002, p. 13.
7 See Wolin, S.: “Hannah Arendt: democracy and the political”, in The Realm of Humanitas: responses to the 
writings of Hannah Arendt. NY, Peter Lang, 1990. According to Zizek, if Arendt is nowadays praised in 
intellectual circles committed to the left this is only the “clearest sign of the theoretical defeat of the left; that 
the left has accepted the central coordinates of liberal democracy (‘democracy’ against ‘totalitarianism’) and is 
trying to redefine its (op)position inside of this space”. Cf. Zizek, S., op. cit., p. 13.
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suddenly brought together by the desire of purifying and embellishing the so-called 
“garden of politics”.8 One should not forget that if such a desire is less present in liberal 
democracies than in totalitarian regimes, both of them share a substantially common 
historical background. In fact, many of those modern historical elements that crystallized 
in totalitarian regimes still remain vastly present in our times, such as racism, 
xenophobia, political apathy and indifference, economic and territorial imperialism, the 
use of lies and violence in mass proportions as a means to dominate whole populations, 
the multiplication of homelessness, of refugees, of those with no country, as well as the 
growing superfluousness of a huge mass of human beings deprived of citizenship and 
economic dignity. Under these conditions we should be attentive not only to the possible 
appearance of new totalitarian regimes, but also to the quasi-totalitarian elements that 
stand right in the core of our representative mass democracies. At the end of her analysis 
of totalitarianism, Arendt herself warned us that as long as huge masses of superfluous 
human beings still abound in the present world it would always remain very tempting to 
any regime to resort to totalitarian measures in order to 'solve' contemporary political 
dilemmas: 
The danger of the corpse factories and holes of oblivion is that today, with populations 
and homelessness everywhere on the increase, masses of people are continuously 
rendered superfluous if we continue to think of our world in utilitarian terms. Political, 
social, and economic events everywhere are in a silent conspiracy with totalitarian 
instruments devised for making men superfluous.  The Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be 
sure that their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the 
problem of overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human 
masses, are much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive 
the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up 
whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a 
manner worth of man.9
Towards the notion of biopolitics in Arendt's thought
What does it mean to characterize the present equation of politics and violence in terms 
of the paradigm of biopolitics? And how can this non-Arendtian notion make any sense in 
Arendt's work? Let us begin with the first question. My contention is that the peculiar 
trait of the political since the turn of the nineteen century up to the contemporary world is 
the paradox of the simultaneous elevation of life to the status of supreme good and the 
multiplication of instances in which life is degraded to the utmost. I think that the 
constitutive element of the political in the present is the reduction of citizenship to the 
lower level of 'bare life', as Agamben understands it, an operation that implies a certain 
politicization of life through which human life is simultaneously divided into the 
categories of life included and protected by the political and economical community and 
8 Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernidad y Holocausto. Toledo: Sequitur, 1997, p. 139.
9 See Arendt, H. Totalitarianism. Part three of The Origins of Totalitarianism. NY, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Publishers, 1968, p. 157.
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life excluded and unprotected, left to degradation and annihilation.10 The answer to the 
second question, that is, how the notion of biopolitics fit into Arendt's work, is contained 
in a nutshell in Arendt's thesis regarding the 'unnatural growth of the natural', a rather 
peculiar formula with which she intended to define the main historical transformations 
suffered by the political in the late modern age.11 The Arendtian formula presented in The 
Human Condition comprises different historical phenomena originating from the 
outcome of the Industrial Revolution, such as the generalization of the capitalist form of 
production of wealth in abundance; the widening of the realm of human necessities, such 
as laboring and consuming, up to the point in which life itself, that is, the eternal life 
process of the human species, became the supreme good and the most important political 
subject-matter; the elevation of laboring activity to the level of the most important human 
activity; the reduction of men to the status of the animal laborans, the prototype of man 
conceived as a living being whose main necessities are tied down to the continuous cycle 
of laboring and consuming; the requirement of the continuous production and 
reproduction of goods in abundance, so that nature was reduced to no more than a stock 
of natural resources abused to the point of almost disappearing from the surface of the 
planet; finally, the transformation of politics into the administrative office responsible for 
the promotion of human happiness by securing the private vital interests of the animal 
laborans. In order to guarantee them it was necessary that the public sphere be 
transformed into a social one, i.e., into the market of private and economic exchanges 
devoted to the production and reproduction of abundant goods destined to almost 
immediate consumption. These goods have to be continuously produced and reproduced 
through ever- increasing laboring activity in order to be massively consumed, thus 
generating an unbreakable cycle. Arendt's thesis is that from the nineteenth century 
onwards the political and its constitutive elements have become increasingly over-
determined by private social and economic interests -governed today by financial 
globalization and free-market ideological discourses -  to the extent that it has been 
transformed into the activity of managing the production and reproduction of the animal 
laborans' life and happiness. To put it in Antonio Negri's and Michael Hardt's terms, the 
industrial and financial powers of the present produce not only commodities, but also 
subjectivities, needs, social relations, bodies and minds, since they actually produce the 
producers.12 
The most evident consequence of this historical process is that we do not even know if 
there is still any space left for the establishment of new radical political alternatives, since 
all State policies, most specially in underdeveloped countries, are always predetermined 
by the rather unstable flows of international financial investments and stock-exchange 
10 I would like to observe that I am not espousing here Agamben’s main thesis concerning biopolitics as the 
ontological core of the political in the Western world. According to him, Western politics is based on the 
sovereign decision of the polis regarding those who can and those who cannot be part of the political 
community, a decision that thus produces ‘bare life’ or unqualified life (mere zoe) that can be discarded. This 
ontological thesis is problematic inasmuch as it prevents us from rethinking and redefining our contemporary 
political scenario beyond its biopolitical historical configuration. See the interesting rendering of Agamben's 
book by Andrew Norris in his article “The exemplary exception”. Philosophical and political decisions in 
Giorgio Agamben's Homo sacer'” Radical Philosophy, n. 119, may-june of 2003.
11 Arendt, H.: The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, p.47. 
12 Negri, Antonio; Hardt, Michael. Imperio. Barcelona, Paidós, 2002, p. 45. 
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fluctuations. The results of these historical changes promoted by the advance of 
capitalism imply many losses, according to Arendt: the loss of the political as the 
constituting space opened up and sustained by new political relations in the world, with 
the consequent surrendering of the spaces of freedom to that of necessity; the loss of free 
and spontaneous action to repetitive and predictable behavior; 13 the invasion and 
destruction of the public and shared common space by private lobbies and other hidden 
pressure groups which easily escape the mechanisms of public vigilance; the substitution 
of blind and mute violence for the possibility of persuasively exchanging opinions; the 
submission of the plurality of political ideas to the so-called unique thinking governed by 
the inexorable laws of the economic market; the weakening of the citizen's ability to 
consent and dissent and the increase of their tendency to blindly obey; in short, the 
obfuscation of people's ability to bring about political novelties through common 
creativity by the tedious reduction of the exercise of freedom to the solitary instant of 
depositing a vote; and the reduction of the political arena to the disputes among the 
highly enclosed and bureaucratized party machines, not to mention repressive State 
actions and the media campaigns of demoralization mobilized against all those political 
agents that do not accept the so called rules of the game - in the media's general discourse 
they will be called anarchistic rioters, anti-system terrorists and the like. The 
contemporary social production of wealth in abundance as connected to mass 
consumerism has transformed human beings into laboring animals and the political 
citizen into a consumering agent in the democratic-supermarket: s/he has a certain 
variety of opinions to choose among, provided that s/he does not question the limited 
political options offered by the whole system. And how could one question a political 
system in which all political parties declare that their aim is to protect citizens' life 
interests and life quality? As Agamben has stated, to question the intrinsic limitations of 
our political system has become more and more difficult since political debates today 
have taken on the task of caring, controlling and enjoying the benefits of bare life: 
traditional political distinctions (such as right and left, liberalism and totalitarianism, 
private and public) have lost their clarity and intelligibility, entering into a zone of 
indetermination, ever since bare life became their fundamental determination. 14 When 
'capitalism has become one with reality', a historical situation that has been aptly 
characterized by Santiago Lopez Petit under the concept of 'postmodern fascism', there 
appears a time in which, according to Marina Garcés, “we are condemned to make choices 
in an elective space in which there are no options. Everything is possible, but we can do 
nothing”15. In other words, our actual political experience is the experience of the 
13 See Arendt, H. The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 321: ìSocialized mankind is that state of society where only 
one interest rules, and the subject of this interest is either classes or man-kind, but neither man nor men. The 
point is that now even the last trace of action in what men were doing, the motive implied in self-interest, 
disappeared. What was left was a ‘natural force’, the force of the life process itself, to which all men and all 
human activities were equally submitted Ö and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all, was survival of the 
animal species man. None of the higher capacities of man was any longer necessary to connect individual life 
with the life of the species; individual life became part of the life process, and to labor, to assure the 
continuity of one’s own life and the life of his family, was all that was needed. 
14 Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. Op. cit., p. 155.
15 See Petit, Santiago Lopez. El Estado guerra. Hondarribia, 2003; see also El infinito y la nada. El querer vivir 
como desafío. Barcelona, Ediciones Bellaterra, 2003. From  Garcés, M. see “Possibilidad y Subversión”. In 
Archipielago, Cuadernos de Crítica de la Cultura, n. 53. Madrid, Edtorial Archipielago, nov. 2002, p. 15; and 
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vanishing of all creative political alternatives, since the practices and discourses of the so 
called anti-globalization movements - 'another globalization is possible', and the like - are 
to a large extent unable to create real alternatives to the economic roles that they are 
intent on confronting.
These historic transformations have not only wrought more violence at the core of the 
political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical violence. As we 
have stated, what characterizes biopolitics is the dynamic of both protecting and 
abandoning life through its inclusion and exclusion from the political and economic 
community. Thus, in Arendtian terms, the aspect that best describes biopolitical danger is 
the risk of converting the animal laborans into what Agamben has described as the homo 
sacer, the human being that can be put to death by anyone and whose death does not 
imply any crime whatsoever.16 In other terms, when politics is conceived of as biopolitics, 
in the sense of increasing life and happiness of the national animal laborans, the Nation-
state becomes more and more violent and murderous. If we link Arendt's thesis from The 
Human Condition to those defended in The Origins of Totalitarianism we understand 
that the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps were the most refined laboratories 
designed for the annihilation of the 'bare life' of the animal laborans, although they were 
not the only instances devoted to human slaughter. Hannah Arendt does not center her 
analysis only on the process of the extermination itself; she also discusses the historical 
process under which large-scale exterminations were rendered possible: the emergence of 
the animal laborans out of uprootedness and superfluousness of modern masses. She 
gives us a hint of this understanding when she affirms, in ”Ideology and Terror: a new 
form of government”, a text written in 1953 and later added to the second edition of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, in 1958, that isolation is that impasse into which men are 
driven when the political sphere of their lives is destroyed. Isolated man who lost his 
place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no 
longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an animal laborans whose necessary 
'metabolism with nature' is of concern of no one. Isolation then become loneliness. 
Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for 
ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected 
with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses 
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and have become acute with the rise of 
imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and 
social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, 
recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world 
at all.17
The historical process of converting the homo faber, the prototype of the human being 
as the creator of durable objects and institutions, into the animal laborans and, later on, 
into the homo sacer, can be retraced in Arendtian terms to the nineteenth century wave of 
imperialist colonization. In this process, European countries imposed well-planned 
administrative genocide in African territories as a means of domination and exploitation. 
As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialist 
also En las prisiones de lo possible. Barcelona, Ediciones Bellaterra, 2003.  
16 See Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. op. cit., p. 112. 
17 See Arendt, H.: Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 173. 
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countries combined racism and bureaucracy and thus promoted the ”most terrible 
massacres in recent history, the Boers' extermination of the Hottentot tribes, the wild 
murdering by Carl Peters in German Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful 
Congo population - from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, 
perhaps the worst of all, it resulted in the triumphant introduction of such means of 
pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies“ 18. This vital equation between 
protecting and destroying life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in 
many other local warlike conflicts, in the course of which whole populations have become 
stateless or deprived of a free political space. It is more than symptomatic that, in spite of 
all their structural political differences, the United States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia 
of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived 
of as States devoted to the production and reproduction of the needs of the national 
animal laborans. According to Agamben, since our contemporary politics does not 
recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and Fascism, that is, regimes which have 
taken bare life as its supreme political criterion, are bound to remain unfortunately 
timely.19 Finally, it is quite obvious that this same vital logic of enforcing and annihilating 
life still continues to be effective both in post-industrial and in underdeveloped countries, 
since economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of 
political exclusion. 
When politics is reduced to the tasks of enforcing, preserving and promoting life and 
happiness of the animal laborans it really does not matter if those objectives require 
increasingly violent acts, both in national and international milieus. Therefore, it should 
not be surprising if today the legality or illegality of the State's violent acts have become a 
secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really matters is to protect and 
stimulate the life of the National (or, depending on the case, Western) animal laborans. In 
order to maintain the sacrosanct ideals of increased mass production and increased mass 
consumerism developed countries can ignore the finite character of natural reserves that 
can jeopardize the future of humanity and thus refuse to sign International Protocols 
regarding the conservation of natural resources and diminishing the emission of 
dangerous polluting gases. They can also launch preventive humanitarian attacks, 
interventions or wars, disregard basic civil rights everywhere, create detention camps that 
escape all legislation, like Guantanamo20, enforce the Airport jails where suspects are kept 
incommunicable, or multiply refugee camps for those who no longer have a homeland or 
have been evacuated from zones of conflict. Some countries have even imprisoned whole 
populations in ghettos or built up concrete walls to physically isolate them from other 
communities and thus give rise to new forms of social, political and economical apartheid. 
In short, there are countries that can allow themselves to impose the highest level of 
violence possible against suspect individuals or political regimes - the so-called 'rogue-
countries', les …tats voyous21 - which, in one way or another, supposedly interfere with the 
18 See Arendt. H. Imperialism. Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism. NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers, 1968, p. 65. 
19See Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. Op. cit., p. 20.
20See Agamben, G. Stato di Eccezione. Turim, Bollati Boringhieri editori, 2003.
21 See Derrida, J. Voyous. Paris, Galillée, 2003.
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security, maintenance and growth of their own national life cycle. If, according to Arendt, 
the common world is the institutional in-between space that should survive the natural 
cycle of life and death of human generations, what happens in modern mass societies 
based on continuous laboring and consuming activities is the progressive abolition of the 
institutional artificial barriers that separate and protect the human world from the forces 
of nature.22 This is what explains the contemporary sensation of vertigo, instability and 
unhappiness, as well as the impossibility of combining stability and novelty in order to 
think and act in a politically creative way.23 However, what should not be missed in the 
Arendtian argument is that in the context of a “waste economy, in which things must be 
almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the 
process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end”24, it becomes not only possible, 
but also necessary, that people be taken as raw material ready to be consumed, discarded 
or annihilated. Therefore, when Arendt announces the “grave danger that eventually no 
object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through 
consumption”25, we should also remember that human annihilation, elevated to the status 
of a supreme and managed end in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur, although 
in different degrees and by different methods, in the contemporary dark holes of the 
oblivion such as miserably poor Third World neighborhoods and Penitentiaries, 
underpaid and infra-human labor camps, not to mention slave labor camps, always in the 
name of protecting the vital interests of the animal laborans. 
To talk about the process of human consumption is not to employ a metaphoric 
language but to properly describe the matter in question. Heidegger had already realized 
it when in the notes written during the late thirties and later published under the title of 
Overcoming Metaphysics. In these notes he stated that the differences between war and 
peace had already been blurred in a society in which “metaphysical man, the animal 
rationale, gets fixed as the laboring animal”, so that “labor is now reaching the 
metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present”.26 Heidegger 
had also already understood that once the world becomes fully determined by the cyclical  
'circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption' it is at the brink of becoming an 
'unworld' (Unwelt), since “man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most 
important raw material, is also drawn into the process. Man is 'the most important raw 
material' because he remains the subject of all consumption”27. After the Second World 
War and the dissemination of detailed information concerning the death factories 
Heidegger pushed his criticisms even further, since he then acknowledged that even the 
understanding of man in terms of both subject and object of the consumption process was 
inadequate to describe the whole process of planned mass annihilation. He then came to 
22Arendt, H.: The Human Condition. Op. cit., p. 126.
23 Arendt, H.: The Human Condition. Op. cit., p. 134: “the universal demand for happiness and the widespread 
unhappiness in our society (and these are but two sides of the same coin) are among the most persuasive 
signs that we have begun to live in a labor society which lacks enough laboring to keep it content”. 
24Arendt, H.: The Human Condition. Op. cit., p. 134. 
25 Arendt, H.: The Human Condition. Op. cit., p. 133.
26See Heidegger, M. “Overcoming Metaphysics”, in Wolin, R. (ed.) The Heidegger Controversy. Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1993, p. 68, translated by Joan Stambaugh. In another passage, at p. 85, he affirms that “War has 
become a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued in peace”. 
27 See Heidegger, M. “Overcoming Metaphysics”. Op. cit., pp. 87 and 84.
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understand this process of human mass dehumanization in terms of the conversion of 
man into nothing more than an 'item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses' 
(Bestandsstücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen), always ready to be 
manipulated, managed and destined to technological production and destruction. What 
happened in the 'extermination camps' (Vernichtungsläger) was not that millions of 
people met death as their own most fundamental possibility; much to the contrary, their 
essential possibility of dying was definitely stolen from them and they merely 'passed 
away' in the process of being 'unconspicuously liquidated' (unauffällig liquidiert).28 Men 
as an animal laborans (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an item of the reserve fund 
(Heidegger) are descriptions of the very same process of dehumanization by means of 
which humankind and human life are reduced to the lowest status of living and 
unqualified raw material. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to 
differentiate between bios and zoe, that is, when bare and unqualified life is transformed 
into a qualified “form of life”29, we can then recognize the emergence of a biopolitical 
epoch in which States promote the animalization of man by policies that aim at both 
protecting and destroying human life. Such considerations favor Agamben's thesis 
concerning the widespread presence of the homo sacer in the contemporary world: “if it is 
true that un-sacrificial life is the figure that our time proposes to us, although life has 
become eliminable in an unprecedented measure, then the bare life of the homo sacer 
concerns us in a particular way. If today there is not a single predetermined figure of the 
sacrificial man, perhaps that is because all of us have virtually become homines sacri”. 30
By discussing the changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn 
of the nineteen-century, Foucault had firstly realized that when life turned out to be a 
constitutive political element, one that had to be carefully managed, calculated, ruled and 
normalized by means of different “caring” policies, giving rise to biopolitical measures, 
these policies soon became murderous ones. When the Sovereign's actions became 
destined to promote and stimulate the growth of life beyond the task of merely imposing 
violent death, wars turned into more and more bloodshed and extermination became a 
regular procedure both within and outside of the Nation. After the constitution of the 
modern biopolitical paradigm, says Foucault, political conflicts aim at preserving and 
intensifying the life of the winners, so that enemies cease to be political opponents and 
come to be seen as biological entities: it is not enough to defeat them, they must be 
exterminated since they constitute risks to the health of the race, people or community. 
Foucault thus characterizes the historical consequences that the emergence and 
consolidation of the modern biopolitical paradigm implied at the turn to the nineteen-
century: death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply 
the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars 
28See Heidegger, M. Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, Gesamtausgabe 79, Frankfurt a.M., Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1994, p. 56. I examine some similarities between Arendtís and Heidegger’s analysis of the 
extermination process led at the death factories in my text “Heidegger, a essência da técnica e as fábricas da 
morte: notas sobre uma questão controversal in Fenomenologia Hoje. Porto-Alegre, Ed. PUCRGS, 2000.
29Agamben, G.: Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. Op. cit., p. 155.
30Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. Op. cit., p. 147. In another passage, the author 
affirms that bare life is not anymore confined in any particular place in contemporary societies, but “inhabits 
in the biological body of all living being”. See Agamben, G.: Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida. 
Op. cit., p. 177.
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were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth-century, and all things being 
equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this 
formidable power of death Ö now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts 
a positive influence on life that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, 
subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer 
waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the 
existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale 
slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of 
life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so 
many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as 
the technology of wars have caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, 
the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly 
informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of 
point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of 
the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the 
tactics of battle - that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living - has become 
the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in case is no longer the 
juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If 
genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of 
the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the 
species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. .31 
Thus, under the biopolitical paradigm “the other's death is not only merely my life, in 
the sense of my personal security; the other's death, the death of the bad race, of the 
inferior race (or of the degenerated or abnormal), is what will render life in general saner; 
saner and more pure”32 In On Violence, Arendt argued a similar thesis concerning the 
violent character of racist or naturalist conceptions of politics. According to Arendt, 
“nothing could be theoretically more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in 
political matters”, in which power and violence are interpreted in terms of biological 
metaphors that can only induce and produce more violence, especially where racial 
matters are involved. Racism as an ideological system of thought is inherently violent and 
murderous because it attacks natural organic data that, as such, cannot be changed by any 
power or persuasion, so that all that can be done when conflicts become radicalized is to 
“exterminate” the other.33 Biopolitical violence, the specific character of different violent 
phenomena underlying both totalitarianism and the quasi-totalitarian elements of 
modern mass democracies, is the tragic inheritance sustained by all kinds of naturalized 
conceptions of the political. According to her views, all forms of naturalizing the political 
31 See Foucault, The History of Sexuality, volume one (translated by Robert Hurley). NY, Vintage Books, 
Random House, 1990, pp. 136-137.
32 [1] Foucault, M. Em defesa da sociedade, op. cit., p. 305.
33 See Arendt, H. On Violence. NY, A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1970, pp. 75-76. Besides, Arendt also notes that “so 
long as we talk in non-political, biological terms, the glorifiers of violence can appeal to the undeniable fact 
that in the household of nature destruction and creation are but two sides of the natural process, so that 
collective violent action, quite apart from its inherent attraction, may appear as natural a prerequisite for the 
collective life of mankind as the struggle for survival and violent death for continuing life in the animal 
kingdom.”
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harm the egalitarian political artificiality without which no defense and 'validation of 
human freedom and dignity' are possible. It was the analysis of the terrible experience of 
both political and economic refugees, of those interned in different kinds of concentration 
camps, of those left with no home and all those who have lost their own place in the 
world, that showed her that nature - and, of course, human nature - cannot ground and 
secure any right or any democratic politics. She herself suffered the consequences of being 
left with no homeland between 1933 and 1951. This denial of any rights whatsoever 
showed her the paradox that the naturalistic understanding and foundation of the Rights 
of Man implied, since once those rights ceased to be recognized and enforced by a 
political community, their ”unalienable” character simply vanished, living unprotected 
exactly those very human beings that mostly needed them: “The Rights of Man, 
supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable whenever people appeared who were 
no longer citizens of a sovereign state”.34 
The core of her argument is that the loss of the Rights of Man did not per se deprive a 
human being of his/her life, liberty, property, equality before the law, freedom of 
expression or the pursuit of happiness; the real 'calamity' was that people in these 
circumstances “no longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that 
they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them”35. In other words, 
nationalistic and racialized biopolitics has produced a huge mass of people that have no 
access to what Arendt has called as the ”right to have rights” insofar as they have been 
stripped of their “right to belong to some kind of organized community”: “Man, it turns 
out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his 
human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity”36. The “abstract 
nakedness” of merely being a human being is not a trustful substitute for the artificial 
character of all the pacts freely consented to by active citizens. By analyzing the dynamic 
of the extermination camps, Arendt understood that “humanity” goes far beyond the 
notion of the human being a mere natural living being with its minimum natural 
denominator: “human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal, 
and that man's 'nature' is only 'human' insofar as it opens up to man the possibility of 
becoming something highly unnatural, that is, a man”37. In other words, humanity, when 
it is politically understood, does not reside in the natural fact of being alive, since human 
beings depend on artificial legal and political institutions to protect them. The Arendtian 
rejection of understanding the human being as a living being in the singular, as well as 
her postulation of human plurality as the condition of all innovative politics depend on 
her thesis that politics has to do with the formation of a common world in the course of  
people's acting and exchanging opinions. Politics depends on the human capacities to 
agree and disagree, so that everything that is mysteriously given to us by nature becomes 
politically irrelevant. For Arendt, equality is not a natural gift, but a political construction 
oriented by the “principle of justice”. In other words, political equality is the result of 
agreements through which people decide to grant themselves equal rights, since the 
political sphere is based on the assumption that equality can be forged by those who act 
34 See Arendt, H. Imperialism. Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 173.
35 See Arendt, H. Imperialism. Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 175-176. 
36 See Arendt, H. Imperialism. Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 177. 
37 See Arendt, H.: Totalitarianism. Part Three of the Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p.153.
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and exchange opinions among themselves and thus change the world in which they live 
in.38 According to Arendt, there can be no democratic politics worthy of the name unless 
everyone, regardless of their nationality, is included in the political and economic 
community of a definite State intending to recognize and protect them as their citizens; 
otherwise, no human being can discover his/her own place in the world. Agamben's thesis 
goes even further than Arendt's in detecting the perplexities inherent to the traditional 
foundation of the Rights of Man. By following up and radicalizing Arendt's reflections, he 
discovers in the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man a fundamental piece of 
modern biopolitics since these rights constitute the very inscription of naked life into the 
political-juridical order. According to Agamben, in the Declarations of the Rights of Man 
of 1789 natural bare life is both the foundational source and the carrier of the rights of 
man, since the man's bare life - or, more precisely, the very fact of being born in a certain 
territory - is the element that effects the transition from the Ancient regime's principle of 
divine sovereignty to modern sovereignty concentrated in the Nation-State: 
It is not possible to understand the development as well as the national and biopolitical 
'vocation' of the National-State in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, if one forgets 
that in its own basis we find out not man as the free and conscious subject but, mostly, 
man's bare life, the mere fact of being born, which, in the transition from the ancient 
subject to the citizen, was invested as such as the principle of sovereignty.39 
To conclude this text, I would like to emphasize that Arendt's main reflections 
concerning totalitarianism still remain relevant nowadays, especially when directed 
towards the feebleness of actually existing democracies. The core of Arendt's diagnosis of 
the present is that whenever politics has mostly to do with the maintenance and increase 
of the vital metabolism of affluent Nation-states, it will be indispensable to reduce the 
animal laborans to the even more degrading status of the homo sacer, of bare and 
unprotected life that can be delivered to oblivion and to death. Our actual understanding 
of politics as the administrative promotion of abundance and the happiness of the human 
being as an animal laborans has as its correlates economic and political exclusion, 
prejudices, violence and genocides against the naked life of the homo sacer. I also believe 
that Arendt can shed light on our current dilemmas, providing us theoretical elements for 
a critical diagnosis of the present as well as for the opening of new possibilities for 
collective action in the world. Arendt was a master of chiaroscuro political thinking in the 
sense that she was never blind to the contrasts between the open possibilities of radically 
renovating the political and the strict chains of a logic that binds violence and political 
exclusion under a biopolitical paradigm. If we still want to remain with Arendt, then we 
have to attentively think and consciously seek to participate in new spaces and new forms 
of life devoted to political association, action and discussion, wherever and whenever they 
seem to subvert the tediously multiplication of the same in its many different everyday 
manifestations. Arendt did not want to propose any political utopia but nor was she 
convinced that our political dilemmas had no other possible outcome, as if history had 
come to a tragic end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she only wanted to understand 
the world in which she lived in and to stimulate us to continue thinking and acting in the 
38See Arendt, H. Imperialism. Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 181.
39 Agamben, G. Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la nuda vida, op. cit., p. 163.
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present. At least, if a radically new political alternative can still come to be in our world, 
the responsibility for it will always be ours. Therefore, if we wish to remain faithful to the 
spirit of Arendt's political thinking, then we should think and act politically without 
constraining our thinking and acting to any previously defined understanding of what 
politics 'is' or 'should' be. In other words, the political challenge of the present is to 
multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can perform our political actions. 
These can be strategic actions destined to enforce political agendas favored by political 
parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favored 
by small groups at the margins of the bureaucratized party machines that promote 
political intervention free of teleological or strategic intents, since their goal is to sustain 
an intense and radical politicization of existence. Finally, there are also actions in which 
ethical openness towards otherness becomes fully political: small and rather 
inconspicuous actions of acknowledging, welcoming, and extending hospitality and 
solidarity towards others.
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